21 April 1982

US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: STATUS REPORT

There will be a meeting of the NSC on Tuesday 27 April at which Part III, sections D-G will be discussed. All of these papers were approved at the IRG of 21 April except section G, "Force Integration." This part will be the subject of another working group meeting on 22 April to ensure that it is fully congruent with section D, "US Nuclear Forces" and to add a further paragraph that will emphasize the need for the US to mobilize its non-military USSR, particularly in view of continuing US disadvantages in the military realm.

SECTION III D: US NUCLEAR FORCES

This paper reconfirms the overall objectives of US nuclear force policy as articulated in NSSD-13. It emphasizes the need to modernize US nuclear forces in light of Soviet capabilities in order to meet the requirements for damage limitation, flexibility of options, crisis stability, escalation control, support of commitments to allies, preservation of the continuum of conventional and nuclear deterrence, maritime nuclear employment, and forward for consideration by the NSC.

SECTION III E: NON-NUCLEAR FORCES

The purpose of this section is to describe national policy with regard to both force development and force application, in both peacetime and wartime. The most contentious issue in this section, as it has been for some time, remains the relationship between multitheater war policy and force expansion priorities. State continues to seek priority for flexible forces tailored for SW Asia, with DOD resisting this commitment and arguing that "multi-purpose forces" are usable in any theater. State, as a corollary, wishes to see SW even with the FYDP, the US will remain in a number of instances unable to meet its objectives.

SECTION III F: SECURITY ASSISTANCE

The current draft is fundamentally the same as earlier drafts. There is unanimity in the IRG that:

(1) A top priority administrative drive should be initiated to win congressional approval for the FY 83 program. This will be addressed separately as a short-term objective.

(2) Long-term recommendations include real growth in the security assistance program for the next 5 years, greater use of multi-year commitments to facilitate planning and predictability, extending our anticipation of and planning for foreign military sales, an effort to rewrite or revise the Arms Control Export Act and the Foreign Assistance Act to remove outdated or inflexible provisions.

SECTION III G: FORCE INTEGRATION

This paper continues to be an issue within DOD with OSD recommendations as noted above. Issues include:

-- Control of space.

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NSC review completed

-- Ballistic missile defense (BMD)

-- Reserve policy, including active duty/reserve ceilings/floors and varying service commitments to total force policy.

-- Unified command, including integration of land and maritime assets and establishment of joint commands (e.g., for SW Asia).

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